AN ASSESSMENT OF THE INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR DEALING WITH CORRUPTION IN THE NIGERIAN PUBLIC SERVICE, 1999-2020

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A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE, DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, FACULTY OF MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, BAZE UNIVERSITY, ABUJA, NIGERIA. AS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR THE AWARD OF BACHELOR OF SCIENCE (B.SC) IN GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.

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This project work has been read and approved by the Department of Government and public administration, Baze University, Abuja, Nigeria, as meeting the requirement for award of Bachelor of Science (B.Sc.) in Government and Public Administration.

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I, Nader Tijani Jibrin, with student identification number BU/17C/BS/2762 hereby declare that this research project is the result of my own investigations, except otherwise stated. I also declare that it has not been previously or concurrently submitted for any degree in Baze University, Nigeria.

Signature……………………… Date………………………………….
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to Almighty God and also to my beloved parents and my siblings who assisted me in one way or the other.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In the course of writing this project, a lot of people assisted me in one way or the other towards the successful take off and completion of the work. First and foremost, I would like to thank Almighty Allah, the most merciful and the most beneficent, for preserving my life and seeing me through the course successfully. To Him belongs the honor and glory. My profound gratitude goes to my supervisor, Mr. Fidelis Moses Alokpa for his patience, guidance enormous support and constant encouragement. His insistence and penchant for excellence spurred me to work hard, stretching my ability to its optimum limit. I could not ask for a better supervisor.

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ABSTRACT

One of the major challenges of governance in Nigeria is corruption especially in the public service. In response to this challenge, the Federal Government established the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) to combat corruption and promote transparency and accountability. Over the years however, the fight against corruption seems not to have achieved the desired result. The general objective of the study was to assess the institutional mechanism for dealing with corruption in the Nigerian public service for the period 1999 – 2020. Specifically, the study; examine the level of effectiveness of the anti-corruption institutions in combating corruption in federal public service, identify the problems faced by the institutions and suggest ways to make them more effective. Data were sourced using both primary and secondary methods. These were presented and analyzed using both descriptive and inferential statistical methods. The study revealed inter alia that; the activities of the institutions, especially the EFCC were severely constrained by undue political interference. Both the ICPC and CCB were not adequately funded and that they all lacked financial autonomy. The study also discovered that punishments for corruption offences were not severe enough to serve deterrence. The study concludes that an increase in the level of autonomy of the anti-corruption institutions and an increase in the level of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences will among other things improve the level of effectiveness of the anti-corruption institutions. The study recommended that the anti-corruption institutions need to be free from political interference and be adequately funded including giving severe punishments for corruption offences.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

One of the major challenges to governance particularly in the twilight of the twentieth and dawn of the twenty-first centuries is corruption. The dimension of the vice has over the years attracted attention of globally. This has placed the fight against corruption as a priority on most governments’ reform agenda. The significance of corruption as a factor that adversely affects the quality of governance has been universally recognised (Vitta, 2000). It is for this reason that the focus and tenor of the fight against corruption has attracted renewed vigor and come under fresh scrutiny as part of a broader good governance agenda. This is partly due to the rise in the incidence of corruption with impunity and mounting evidence of its multi-dimensional impact (African Development Bank (AfDB) 2006).

As a global malaise corruption which has been known to spare no country in the world. Its alarming pervasiveness in Nigeria has been militating against the country’s quest for accelerated socio-economic and political development, thus becoming a matter of public concern. Corruption has also been contributing towards the degrading of socio-economic and political bases of the country. Moreover, corruption is undermining our nascent democracy and legitimacy of government by subverting formal processes of governance. This has reduced peoples trust in their institutions and leaders. Similarly, corruption in elections and in electoral bodies has reduced accountability and representation in policy making. In public administration, it has resulted to ineffective service delivery (African Diaspora Initiative, 2007).
Corruption is manifested in different sections of the Public Service. These include inter-alia electoral malpractices, poor service delivery, contract inflations, bribery scandals, money laundering, ghost workers syndrome, and outright looting of the public treasury. For instance, while the country has been in darkness due to epileptic electric power supply over the years, political office holders in connivance with career civil servants were alleged to have diverted the sum of N5.2 billion meant for Rural Electrification Agency in a Contract Scam (Tell Magazine, June and July, 2009).

The Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, section 15(5) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended provides that, “the state shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power.” Prior to the Fourth Republic, successive administration in Nigeria established either permanent or ad hoc institutional mechanisms for fighting corruption. These include inter-alia; the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree of 1966 which was succeeded by the Corrupt Practices Decree of 1975; the establishment of the Code of Conduct Bureau in the Second Republic, the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) of 1983, and the War Against Indiscipline and Corruption (Bello – Imam, 2005).

The Federal Public Service also has self-regulating provisions for checking corruption. These include; the Civil Service Rules and Financial Regulations. Others are the Civil Service Hierarchy, the Legislature; the Judiciary; the Public Complaints Commission, the Auditor-Generals Report and the Public Accounts Committee Report among others (Adamolekun, 2006). However, since corruption in the Federal Public Service has become systemic and endemic, these conventional mechanisms have proven to be ineffective in fighting corruption.
After the return to democratic governance in 1999 and the persistent quest by people to fighting corruption in the Federal Public Service, the government in response established some institutions and mechanisms such as the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) established in 2000 and 2002 respectively. Others were the Public Procurement Act 2007, the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007, and the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative Act 2007. This is in addition to earlier existing institutions such as the Code of Conduct Bureau and its Tribunal.

The ICPC was established vide the ICPC Act of 13 June, 2000 with the major objective of prohibiting and prescribing punishments for corrupt practices and other related offences. Specifically, the agency is to banish impunity for corrupt practices and other related offences through system study, education, public enlightenment and mobilisation. The EFCC was established in 2002 by an Act of National Assembly and Amended in 2004 vide the EFCC Act, 2004. The agency was established with the objective of sanitising the national economic environment by enforcing all economic and financial crime laws.

The Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) was established through Decree No. 1 of 1989 and entrench and in section 153 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as one of the Federal Executive Agencies. The CCB was established to establish and maintain a high standard of morality in the conduct of government business and to ensure that the actions and behaviors of public officers conform with the highest standard of public morality and accountability.
1.2 Statement of the Problem

Historically, most regime changes especially by the military were ostensibly necessitated by the need to combat corruption. Despite these regime changes, not much success has ever been recorded at fighting corruption in the country (Njoku, 2007). The return to democratic governance in the country in 1999 more than ever before aroused the citizen’s quest to combating corruption and instituting accountability and transparency in governance. Consequently, the ICPC and EFCC were established among other institutions through enabling laws. This is in addition to already existing institutions such as the (CCB) and its Tribunal. In spite of all these, Ali (2007) reiterating the view of Mier (2000) observes that, corruption still remains the fastest way of getting anything done in Nigeria.

The anti-corruption institutions established appeared to be suffering from political intervention and inadequate autonomy. This is clear, with the unceremonious removal of most of the former Chairmen of the EFCC, namely; Nuhu Ribadu, Farida Waziri and very recently, Ibrahim Magu. Laws establishing the anticorruption institutions could not be upheld due to institutional weaknesses (Aduda, 2007). Furthermore, corrupt public officials seemed to be immune from the activities of the anti-corruption institutions as long as the presidents wished while perceived non-loyalist are hunted such as in the case of the former Delta State Governor, James Ibori (Shettima, 2010).

There seemed to be excessive secrecy in the business of government. Little is known about public servants and the business of governance. There seemed to be asymmetrical information and a lack of transparency leading to sub-optimal performance by anti-corruption institutions due to weak corruption reporting systems (FRN; 2003; Aduda, 2007). Most public servants tend to be unwilling to declare their assets and prefer to run the affairs of the public in secrecy.
This has brought the effectiveness of the institutional mechanisms of anti-corruption to question. Because, it has clearly shown that the provisions of the laws establishing them cannot be enforced. For instance, according to Ribadu as enunciated by Buhari in Zero Tolerance (2007), thirty-one out of the thirty-six former state chief executives between 1999 – 2007 were alleged to be corrupt. However, only the former Bayelsa State Governor (DSP Alamieyesiegha) was convicted on 26 July, 2006 but freed in 2008. Corruption charges against high profile persons drag on for years. The Chairmen of the EFCC and the ICPC have become disgusted with the way the judiciary handles corruption cases that they have called for special anti-corruption courts to be set up (Akinyemi, 2010). Nigerians do not believe that enough sanctions exist to deter people from corruption (FRN; 2003). In an empirical study, Aduda (2007) observes that majority (83%) of the respondents perceived the level of corruption in the public sector to be very high.

Transparency International’s (TIs) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for Nigeria staggers between the lowest of 1.0 in 2001 to the highest of 2.7 in 2008 only to slip back to 2.5 in 2009 only for it to go higher in 2012 to 27 and 2015 it dropped to 26.

1.3 Research Questions

The questions arising from the research problem in 1.2 above were;

(i) How effective are the anti-corruption institutions for combating corruption in the Federal Public Service?

(ii) What are the problems associated with the effective functioning of these mechanisms?

(iii) What can be done to make the Anti-corruption institutions more effective in the federal public service in Nigeria?
1.4 Objectives of the Study

The major objective of this study is to assess the effectiveness or otherwise of the institutional mechanisms for dealing with corruption in the Nigeria Public Service between 1999 to 2020, the specific objectives of the study are to:

(i) Examine the level of effectiveness of the anti-corruption institutions in combating corruption in Federal public service.

(ii) Identify the problems facing the anti-corruption institutions in fighting corruption in the Federal Public Service; and

(iii) Suggests ways to make the anti-corruptions institutions more effective in the Federal Public Service.

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study has both theoretical and empirical significance.

Theoretically, the literature is largely recent. The data generated will certainly provide useful information to researchers. The findings of the study will likely challenge earlier researches and thus, provoke further research on how to make the anti-corruption institutions more effective.

To the staff of these anti-corruption institutions and other administrators, the findings of this study will provide them with more insight on the challenges of these institutions with a view to readjusting their skills and methods of operation.

Empirically, policy makers will gain from the study as it will enable them identify present policy lapses and loop holes in the existing mechanisms with a view to fine-tuning them.
Finally, though not exhaustively, the citizenry who are often the victims of corrupt practices in the public service and who are most desirous of fighting against the vice to ensure transparency and accountability entrenched in the Federal Public Service will equally find this study interesting. This is because it will provide them with more information and enlightenment about the workings of the anti-corruption institutions. It will also place them in a better position of contribution because, the fight against corruption is a fight for all. Stakeholders can thus access the study on internet, libraries and possibly have copies from the researcher as he is likely to relate and create a rapport with some staff of the institutions in the course of the study.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

Corruption occurs in both private and public sectors. However, this study covers corruption in the Public Service only. This does not mean that there less corruption incidence in the private sector. The choice of corruption in the Public Sector can be justified on the ground of being of greater concern to the general public. After all, a government which cannot influence the activities of its officials is unlikely to be able to reduce private sector incidence of corruption (Huther and Shah 2000). The study is also limited to the Federal Public Service in Nigeria bearing in mind that corruption also takes place in the state and local government services. The choice of Federal Public Service can be justified on the ground of its pervading nature and in order to give the study more focus and depth.

Although, there are many anti-corruption institutions in the Federal Public Service, this study focuses on the operation of the CCB, the ICPC, and the EFCC. This is aimed at making the study more focused. The study is also limited to the effectiveness of the anti-corruption institutions in the Federal Public Service bearing in mind that their mandate extends to the state and local government services.
The time frame for this study is for the period 1999 – 2020. The choice of this period can be justified on the basis of being a period of return to a sustained democratic rule in Nigeria. Principles of transparency and accountability are enshrined in democratic governance than is required of military regimes. Moreover, almost all the institutional mechanisms in this study were established between 1999 – 2020. This is because, the anti-corruption institutions ought to have proved their effectiveness or otherwise within this period. This study no doubt is bound to have some limitations. For instance, the primary data collected has as its target population the staff of CCB, EFCC and ICPC.

1.7 Definition of Concepts

1.7.1 Corruption

Although, corruption is a very common term, it is any act or omission perpetrated contrary to existing rules or procedures with the intention to defraud.

1.7.2 Corruption Reporting System

It refers to the ability of the people to understand what constitute corruption and have knowledge of the channel through which at can be brought to the attention of the institution charged with the responsibility of dealing with such matters.

1.7.3 Effectiveness

It refers to the extent a measure or measures put in place to achieve certain objective or purpose lives up to expectation. With regards to dealing with corruption, the effectiveness of anti-corruption institute depends on its ability to deal with corruption cases brought before up to the level of successful trial and conviction. To some extent the ability of the institution to serve as a deterrence is a measure of effectiveness.
1.7.4 Enforcement

It refers to the steps or action taken to ensure the implementation of punishment in execution of law.

1.7.5 Institutional Autonomy

It is the freedom of an organization to pursue its objectives and function without outside interference.

1.7.6 Anti-Corruption Institutions

This are establishment created by government, to investigate or adjudicate on matter of corruption or investigate public and private affair e.g. EFCC, ICPC and CCB.

1.7.7 Public Service

It refers to all the administrative institutions including personnel that perform government activities. They are involved in day to day formulation of polices and strategies of governmental and execution toward achieving the desired goals.

1.7.8 Punishment

It can be defined as importance of hardship or some sort of restraint link to violation laws or regulations. In dealing with corruption cases punishment is expected to be commensurate with the nature of offence. It could be jail term, payment or both.

1.7.9 Transparency

It refers to people having unfettered access to information on most of the activities of the government. The access should include but not limited to government finances, procurement, issues of electoral process and empowerment opportunities. There measure of transparence when people can report corruption cases to anti-corruption institutions with fear of molestation or any form of hindrance.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the literature on the variables and concepts relevant to the study. These include the concept and types of corruption, the perceived causes of corruption, strategies for combating corruption in the Federal Public/Civil Service. Others include; concept of whistle-blowing policy, concept of plea bargaining, reporting corruption and enforcement of punishments for corruption offences. The second part of the section examines the theoretical framework using the Institutional theory.

2.2 Literature Review

2.2.1 The Concept and Types of Corruption

As real and pervasive as corruption is, it defies a precise definition. Scholars, practitioners and institutions have advanced different definitions of the concept. Transparency International (TI) (1999, 2002), the world’s most reputable non-governmental anti-corruption watchdog Tanzi (1998), and the World Bank (1997) define corruption as the abuse of public office for private gains. Svensson (2005) also sees corruption as the misuse of public office for private gain. This to him involves applying a legal standard. He also observes as Brownsberger (1983) did, that corruption is an outcome or reflection of a country’s legal economic, cultural and political institutions. The scholar gave examples of corruption to include sale of government property by government officials, kickbacks in public procurement, bribery and embezzlement of government funds. This definition as those of TI (1999,2002) and the World Bank (1997) is concerned with public sector corruption which is the concern of this study. It is however, worthy to note that in spite of any difference in countries legal, economic, cultural and political institutions, corruption in the public realm involves the misuses of public office for private gains.
Otite (1986, p.12) sees corruption as;

*state of affairs through bribery, favour, or moral depravity; when at least, two parties have interacted to change the structure or process of society or the behavior of functionaries in order to provide dishonest, unfaithful or defiled situations, then, corruption has taken place. It therefore, involves the injection of additional but improper transactions aimed at changing the normal course of events and altering judgements and positions of events.*

This definition points out that, corruption involves the manipulation of due processes, induced behavior of functionaries to desecrate the norms, ethics and statutory provisions in an organisation. It is not however particular to the public service alone. In addition, an act of corruption is not always the injection of additional but improper transactions, it could also be a deliberate act of omission for self-interest or for the interest of a third party.

Otite (1986, p.12) argues that it is easier to identify what corruption is not as opposed to what it is because of the wide array of forms and colours in which corruption manifests itself. He opines that corruption represents a “deviation from the normal, and with regard to official corruption, the concept refers to the deviation from the duties or rules of the public service.” This definition acknowledged that corruption takes place in both public and private sectors. However, the assertion that corruption is the deviation from the duties or rules of the public service makes it too general.

Brownsberger (1983) agrees that corruption invariably refer to a misapplication of public goods to private ends but equally argues that the notion of what is public, what is held in trust for the people, vary across cultures, thus making corruption a relative concept. He however squared corruption on the misapplications of public goods in the form of bribery, nepotism, political favouritism and the violation of western legal and regulatory codes that have been inherited by developing countries, along with western state structures, from their colonial governments. This definition is only concerned with public sector corruption to the neglect of private sector corruption. In addition, the
assertion that corruption is the violation of western legal and regulatory codes that were inherited through colonialism is no longer tenable as most of these inherited western codes have been reformed after independence from the western countries.

Adagba (2007), expatiates the views of Khan (1996) in defining corruption as an act which deviates from the rules of conduct governing the action of someone in position of public authority because of private regarding motives – such as wealth and power. The African Development Bank (AfDB) (2006) defines corruption as misappropriation of public assets or public office/trust for private gain. The ADB also identifies two major types of corruption. These are; grand corruption and bureaucratic corruption. Grand corruption involving big businesses and highly placed officials results in state capture such as those of Siemens Brothers and Wibrow International. Bureaucratic corruption involves the offer of incentives by citizens in return for favour from public servants in service provision.

Ekumankama (2002) reiterating the views of Atlas (1980) and Brooks (1990), identifies three common elements in the definition of corruption. These are: abuse of power; violation of official or judiciary duty; and intentional design for personal gain against the interest of the public or individuals. These acts usually take place in secrecy. It is line with the above definition that Njokwu (2007, p3) defines corruption “as taking undue personal advantage of one’s position against the perceive common good of society.”

From a narrower perspective, Onaiyekan (2008) sees public corruption as largely referring to the misuse of public funds or the appropriation of resources meant for the community into private pocket. While Osoba (2005;1) defines it “as an anti-social behaviour conferring improper benefits contrary to legal and moral norms and which undermines the authorities capacity to secure the welfare of the state.” To the Jamaican Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (2000),
corruption is simply the misuse of public office for private gain for the benefit of the holder of the office or some third party.

Aduda (2007) in his empirical study defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. He explains that public office is abused when officials accepts, solicits or extorts a bribe and when private agents offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profits. Others include patronage and nepotism, theft of state assets or diversion of state revenues among others. Bribery was however found to be the most common form of corruption known to the respondents of the study.

Bello – Imam (2005) reiterates the views of Bayley (1966) and Nye (1967) in defining corruption as a deviation from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding motives (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary exercise of certain types of private regarding influence which include bribery; nepotism; and misappropriation. Corruption to Bayley (1966) however, transcends personal monetary gain. In view of this definitional crisis, it is inevitable to settle for an operational definition of corruption which according to Bello – Imam (2005) is any induced or un-induced behaviour within a complex or private organisation to falsify its integrity, purpose, virtue and ethics. He also identifies five different types of corruption as; political, economic, bureaucratic, judicial and moral corruption.

Operationally, Adebayo (1986), defines corruption by identifying its attributes in an ascending order which inter-alia include; using official stationery for self; using government drugs, dressings and hospital equipment for private purposes. Others include using government time for private work; demanding money and or sex from applicants for jobs; tampering with contract documents and payment vouchers; election malpractices; obtaining import licences under false pretence, and inflation of contracts.
The definitions offered by Otite (1986) and Njoku (2007) are from a sociological point of view. They are concerned with corruption in the society in general and not particular to the public sector as those of Khan (1996), World Bank (1997), TI (1999, 2002), ADB (2006) and Onaiyekan (2008) among others. Khan’s definition however squared corruption in the public sector as if it does not take place in the private sector. It however, fits well into the public sector which is the concern of this study. While this definition as those of TI, the World Bank and ADB, fits our need, it is important to note that corrupt practices are sometimes not committed for self gain but for a third party as pointed out by Bello-Imam (2005) and the Jamaican Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (2000).

As Osoba (2005, p1) observes, “corruption is an anti-social action.” This is why it takes place in secrecy (Ekumakama, 2002). It is the misuse or abuse of public office, trust or authority by conferring improper or undue benefits on oneself or others contrary to legal, statutory or ethical norms of the Public Service. This can be in the form of bribery, inflation of contracts, tempering with payment vouchers, embezzlement and diversion of public funds and or property. Others include deliberate breach of procedures and rules of the public service for private gain. This undermines the capacity of the public service in discharging its responsibilities. In identifying the types of corruption, different criteria can be considered. These include the size and sectors; economic, political, bureaucratic, judicial and even moral realms.

2.2.2 The Perceived Causes of Corruption in the Federal Public Service

The causes of corruption in the Federal Public Service are varied and dynamic. Ribadu (2006) attributes it to the country’s history of prolonged military rule that dominated the political scene, subdued the rule of law, facilitated wanton looting of public treasury, depimated public institutions and instituted a secret and opaque culture in the running of government business. TI (2008) observes
that, corruption is a product of environmental variables. It thrives where temptation co-exist with permissiveness; where institutional checks on power are missing; where decision making remains obscure; where civil society is thin on the ground; and where great inequalities in the distribution of wealth condemn people to live in poverty.

The Federal Government of Nigeria in 2001 assigned a consortium of Federal institutions led by the Institute for Development Research, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria to conduct a Governance and Corruption Survey study. The report was released in 2003. In the opinion of public officials, the major causes of corruption in the public service were low salary for public officials and lack of transparent political process. Others include lack of effective corruption reporting system, lack of effective judiciary and ineffective mass media among others by Adagba OS (2007).

The African Development Bank (2006) argues that, corrupt practices becomes the exemption rather than the norm if the likelihood of being caught is high, if the consequence once caught is predictable and severe, and if it is generally condemned by society. The AfDB (2006) and Gregory (2007) summarises the dynamics of public sector corruption using a simple model; \( C = M + D - A \); when \( C \) is corruption, \( M \) is monopoly, \( D \) is discretion and \( A \) is accountability. That is, corruption = monopoly + discretion – accountability. Under this model, a public servant is assumed to have monopoly of power over goods or services which generate economic rent, and has discretion to decide who will acquire it. That is, he determines how rent is distributed, and is not accountable for his action.

Bello Imam (2005) identifies the sources of corruption as; Trade Restrictions; Government Subsidies, Price Control, Low Wages in the Public Service, weak democratic structures, and sociological factors inter-alia. In their contributions Ekumankama (2002) and Adebayo (1986) identifies diminished societal value system; poor leadership and political instability; lack of effective
internal control and the problem of prosecution and inadequate sanctions against offenders has been responsible for the high rate of corruption in the Federal Public Service.

In developing countries like Nigeria, virtually every aspect of the citizens activities have to be authorised and regulated by the government. These range from owing a shop, borrowing money, investing, owing and driving a car, building a house obtaining foreign exchange, getting a passport and so on. Government monopoly in the granting of these authorisations gives the bureaucrats a great amount of power and a good opportunity to extract bribes.

Studies by Global Integrity (2004, 2006 and 2007) found no relationship between democracy and corruption in the world. Ribadu’s (2006) assertion that, the high rate of corruption in the Federal Public Service is mainly due to the prolonged period of military dictatorship then becomes hollow. However, the conditions that favour corruption as identified by TI (2008)are typical of military regimes. Then, one may argue that, the persistence of corruption in the Federal Public Service can partly be attributed to the prolonged military rule. Others such as Ekumankama (2005) and Adebayo (1986) observes were fading societal value system, ineffective internal control and the problem of prosecution and inadequate sanctions for offenders, and weak democratic structures among others as constituting problems to an effective fight against corruption in the Federal Public Service.

From the views of the scholars and institutions, the causes of corruption are multi-dimensional. They are institutional, societal, political, judicial and economic. Under resourced and weak institutions (courts and anti-corruption institutions) can not effectively fight corruption. A corrupt society produces corrupt public service. Corrupt political process produces corrupt legislators and executives. A poorly paid public service will be more prone to corruption than a well paid one.
Excessive secrecy in public service will make the detection and investigation of corruption cases difficult.

Public sector corruption is generally connected with the state powers and especially with its monopoly and discretionary powers. Some of these factors are direct causes of corruption such as political party financing, subsidies, mild punishment for corruption offences and weak institutional controls. The indirect factors are societal such as the tendency to make sudden wealth and waning societal norms such as honesty, and hard work.

2.2.3 Strategies for Combating Corruption in the Federal Public Service

If the anti-corruption institutions are to be effective in fighting corruption in the Federal Public Service thereby ameliorating the adverse consequences of the vice, certain strategies need to be taken. Concerned institutions and scholars such as AfDB (2006) Adebayo (1986), Ali (2007) Braibanti (1966), Ekumankama (2002) and Njoku (2007) identified strategies for fighting corruption in the Federal Public Service. Adebayo (1986) suggests the growth and development of a culture that will inculcate the right sense of values which to him can be achieved through education rather than statutory legislations.

Braibanti (1966) suggests societal value re-orientation; creation of alternative means of employment; sincere political commitment; precision of investigative and sanctional devices; and strong judiciary and legislature to restrain bureaucratic excesses. Ali (2007) advocates making public declaration of assets and liabilities by all class of public servants compulsory to enhance transparency. He also advocates the careful amendment of section 308 of the 1999 constitution to remove the immunity clause to enable anti-corruption institutions timely investigate and prosecute chief executives and their deputies at the federal and state levels. Others are the inclusion of anti-corruption clauses in all
public contract agreements and the adoption of the Chinese and Saudi-Arabian models for punishment (execution) of corrupt officials as an antidote.

Similarly, the “Eagle Watch” (2008) considers robust demonstration of political will at all levels of government to fight corruption; amendment of section 308 of the 1999 Constitution as it relates to all criminal matters and elimination of all forms of protection for corruption in high places. The “Eagle Watch” (2008), also stressed the need for value orientation in the family and society and the refusal by communities, universities, organisations to reward corrupt enrichment. It also advocates the others include; immediate auditing and scrutiny of all security votes, information funds and all such votes however named and putting in place clear parameters consistent with international best practice to prevent abuses associated with the use of the funds.

TI (2003) advocates the reform of political parties, the courts and the police. Njoku (2007) in his contribution stresses the need for structural considerations which include fundamental changes in the perception of public office, restructuring the modus operandi of public administration and strengthening the necessary checks and balances to enable the ordinary citizens exercise sufficient pressures on their public officials.

The AfDB (2006) offers more encompassing strategies for combating corruption. It asserts that, anti-corruption strategies must address the broader governance and institutional raison de’être that gives rise to the problem in the first instance. At the individual level, it must address the elements of rational choice which rationalises corrupt practices as low-risk high-gain endeavours rather than the opposite, thus, the need for enforcement of severe punishment for corruption offences. More broadly, AfDB stressed that an effective anti-corruption crusade must be country specific, but also based on internationally accepted norms and standard. The strategy must incorporate elements of prevention,
detection, investigation, enforcement, public awareness and institution building. It is worthy to note that, in the fight against corruption, the optimal level may not be zero but that it should be reduced to manageable level. It also requires consistent, coherent, broad based approach and long term perspective.

Specifically, the AfDB (2008) advocates for; sustained political will and leadership committed to fighting corruption; strengthening institutions; and reform of the public sector. This include; Financial Management such as the Fiscal Responsibility Bill, Civil Service Reforms; Tax and Revenue Reforms; Public Procurement; and Independent Anti-Corruption Institutions. Other strategies include; reform of the legal and judicial system; strong legislature, existence of vibrant civil society organisations; and international collaboration since corruption money has wings not wheels. As in other developing countries, looted money easily find save heavens abroad (Vittal 2000).

It is in view of this that Doig and McLvor (1999) advocate that recent anti-corruption strategies should cover a number of areas viz; legal, organisational, financial and civic. These include anti-corruption agencies whose effectiveness would depend on administrative and political autonomy, independence from the police, independent financial resources and recruitment powers. Others are combination of prevention, awareness, investigation and prosecution as well as an extensive legal framework.

From the views of the AfDB (2006), Braibanti (1966) and the Eagle Eye (2008), it is clear that a successful fight against corruption must be multidimensional requiring societal value re-orientation; sustained political will and leadership committed to fighting corruption at all levels of government; strong legislature as well as independent judiciary and anti-corruption institutions. Others are reform of the public service, existence of vibrant civil society organisations and international collaboration. These need to be consistent and embracing in terms of detection investigation and speedy
enforcement. It must be pointed out that, whatever strategy is adopted as an antidote, it should target the root causes of corruption in the country. In addition, the strategies should be comprehensive in terms of legal, organisation, financial and civic-ranging from initiatives directly intended to combat corruption to those which minimise the opportunity and incentive for corruption.

2.2.4 Concept of Whistle-Blowing Policy

According to Adeyemo (2015) stated that, the act of whistle-blowing is the disclosure of the behaviour of a company, or those who are placed in a position of responsibility, that is illegal, immoral or could be categorized as a serious wrong doing. First Bank of Nigeria (FBN) (2016) opined that, whistle-blowing is the act of reporting an observed/perceived unethical misconduct of employees, management, directors and other stakeholders of an institution by an employee or other person to appropriate authority. It is an early warning system that enables an organization to find out when something is going wrong in time to take necessary corrective action. There are several characteristics required to qualify the act of “disclosed information”. Firstly, there is the intentional disclosure of information. Secondly, the person disclosing this information would normally be within close proximity to the employer. Thirdly, the information sought to be disclosed needs to be pertaining to the company/organisation in question. Finally, the disclosure needs to be in the public or private interest (Adeyemo, 2015).

According to Minister of Finance, Kemi Adeosun, among the selling points of the policy are;

(a) The possibility of increased accountability and transparency in the management of public funds and;

(b) The possibility that more funds would be recovered that could be deployed in financing Nigeria’s infrastructural deficit (Punch, 2016). In the final analysis, it is hoped that the
more accountable the government becomes, the higher will be Nigeria’s ranking on the indicators of openness and ease of doing business. The ultimate goal is to develop a corruption-free society and attract more and more foreign investors (Punch, 2016). Components of Whistle-blowing Policy Ministry of Finance in 2016 as reported by the Punch stated that, the whistle-blower policy consists of three major components.

(1). Channels for reporting information and the type of information to be reported. Anyone, said the minister, who has “authentic information about violation, misconduct, or improper activity which can impact negatively on the Nigerian people and government” should report it through one or the other of three channels: The violations include, but are not limited to mismanagement or misappropriation of public funds and assets; financial malpractice or fraud; collecting/soliciting bribes; diversion of revenue; fraudulent and unapproved payments; and procurement fraud (notably, kickbacks and over-invoicing).

(2). Reward for reporting fraud. The whistle-blower will get between 2.5 per cent (minimum) and five per cent (maximum) of the recovered loot, provided that “there is a voluntary return of stolen or concealed public funds or assets on the account of the information provided”. It is still not clear how the exact amount of the reward will be calculated. The policy is also silent on whether whistle-blowers will be entitled to a share of the loot recovered after the looter has been duly convicted.

(3). Assurance of Protection to Whistle-blowers “If you feel that you have been treated badly because of your report, you can file a formal complaint. If you have suffered harassment, intimidation or victimization, for sharing your concerns,
restitution will be made for any loss suffered”. It is hoped that the details of the restitution will be fully specified in the policy. In this paper the whistle-blowing programme is a mechanism designed to encourage anyone with information about a violation of financial regulations, mismanagement of public funds and assets, financial malpractice, fraud and theft to report it.

2.2.5 Concept of Plea Bargaining

It is a tough task to define plea bargaining because its meaning is sometimes elusive and can encompass a variety of practice. The term can be used to describe many different situation and relationships. Plea Bargaining is not a monolithic concept. Clark,(1986). While searching for dictionary meaning one can get meaning only after connecting the two words together, that is ‘plea’ meaning to bring forward one’s excuse, justification, and defenses and ‘bargaining ’which means to arrive at agreement of favorable purchase. Ranjam (2007).

As the term implies, plea bargaining involves an active negotiation process whereby an accused is allowed to confess his guilty in Court in exchange of a lighter punishment that would have been given for such an offence. The expression ‘Plea Bargaining’ as such has not been defined in Chapter XXI-A of the Code. In criminal cases, it refers to pre-trial negotiations between accused and prosecution during which the accused may agree to plead guilty in exchange for certain concession by prosecutor. “Plead Guilty and bargain lessor sentence” is the shortest meaning of plea bargaining. In its traditional sense, plea bargaining refers to pre-trial negotiations between the defendant, usually conducted by the counsel and the prosecution during which the defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for certain concessions by the prosecutor.
As a result of plea bargaining accused would not be sentenced to death. The definition of plea bargaining varies depending on the jurisdiction and on the context of its use. Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “The process whereby the accused and the prosecutor in a criminal case workout a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the accused pleading guilty to lesser offence or to only one or some of the counts of multi-count indictment in return for lighter sentence than that position for the grave charge. Similarly Oxford Dictionary (1995) defines plea bargaining as “an arrangement between prosecutor and defendant whereby the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser charge in exchange for more lenient sentence or an agreement to drop other charges.”

Plea Bargaining consists of the exchange of official concessions for a defendant’s act of self-conviction. The parties to the agreement will usually be the accused and prosecutor but it is also possible for the police or the court to be party to plea bargaining. All said, in general terms plea bargaining can be described as an agreement that takes place at the pre-trial stage where in accused pleads guilty in lieu of some concessions given by the prosecutor but may occur at any time before a judgment is rendered. From the point of view of the accused it means that he trades conviction and a lesser sentence, for a long, expensive and tortuous process of undergoing trial where he may be convicted.

2.2.6 Reporting Corruption

The willingness of people to report corruption is very critical for any successful fight against corruption. Lack of an effective corruption-reporting system encourages those in engaged in corruption to continue with the vice while deterring people from seeking redress (FRN, 2003). One of the major weaknesses identified in the Federal Government’s Governance and Corruption Study is the inadequate corruption – reporting mechanisms in public institutions. The study discovered that
households do not know the process to follow in reporting an act of corruption by a public officer even though they observed acts of corruption.

The respondents completely disagreed that the corruption reporting was effective and simple in the public service. Most of the respondents also opined that they do not report corruption mainly because, they expect that the case will not be investigated, enforced and the fear of potential harassment and reprisal (FRN; 2003). For corruption reporting system to be effective, the public servants must be oriented on the activities of the anti-corruption institutions, and the reporting system simplified. Reported cases should be promptly investigated and punishment enforced. The identity of those who report alleged acts of corruption should be held in confidence (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2003).

2.2.7 Enforcement of Punishments for Corruption Offences

Any genuine fight against corruption must be multi-faceted. That is, it should be concerned with enlightenment, prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution, trial, and sanctioning. Corrupt practices therefore, become the exception rather than the norm if the likelihood of being caught is high, if the consequence once caught is predictable and severe. Enforcement of punishments for corrupt practices can serve as a deterrent against corruption (ADB;2006).

Sections 8 – 26 of the ICPC Act (2000), stipulates corrupt offences and their penalties. These offences and penalties include; corrupt acquisition of property or benefit of any kind, seven years imprisonment. Other offences and their punishments include corruptly giving or conferring or procuring any property or benefit of any kind to, on or for a public officer or for any other person, seven years imprisonment; asking for, receiving or obtaining property or benefits of any kind for himself and any other person, seven years; and person who with intent to defraud or conceal a crime
or frustrate the commission in its investigation of any suspected crime of corruption under the act, the punishment is seven years jail term. In addition, any person employed in the public service knowingly acquires or holds equity directly or indirectly, otherwise than as a member of a registered joint stock company consisting of twenty persons has a punishment of seven years imprisonment.

It also inter-alia include any person who offers to any public officer, or being a public officer solicit, counsel or accepts any gratification, four years imprisonment penalties for the different offences ranges from three to seven years imprisonment regardless of their weight and sometimes with option of fine that only the rich and corrupt public servants could easily afford. These penalties are not severe when compared with similar offences in other countries. In India for example, a public servant is imprisoned for three years for accepting half a dollar bribe (Tell Magazine, 9 March, 2009). It is execution for weightier corrupt practices in China and Saudi-Arabia (Ali; 2007).

Similarly, Section Eighteen of the EFCC Act (2004) also identified Economic and Financial Crimes as well as their penalties ranging between one-two years imprisonment. Section 18 (2) (a – c) of the fifth schedule to the 1999 Constitution also spells out punishments for breach of the code of conduct for public officers. They are not more severe than those of ICPC and EFCC.

Bello – Imam (2005), Falana (2006, 2007), Onaiyekan (2008), Ekwueme (2009) frown at the immunity clause as contained in section 308 of the 1999 constitution which was meant to prevent Chief Executives and their deputies at the Federal and State levels from undue destructive harassment by frivolous litigants. This has now been catapulted to a position where immunity becomes impunity (Ekwueme 2009). The trials of alleged corrupt former state chief executives in Nigeria are yet to be concluded. In Nigeria, the former Baylesa State Governor, DSP Alamieyeseigha was convicted and sentenced to twelve years in imprisonment on 26 July, 2006 but was freed in 2008.
On July 11, 2007, Kalu was arrested by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission on charges of corruption while serving as the governor of Abia State. He was sentenced to 12 years in prison for N7.65 billion fraud. He was later released on bail, and accused the Obasanjo regime of persecuting him during and after his tenure in office, an accusation mentioned by former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria John Campbell in his book, "Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink. He was later held in custody at the Ikoyi prisons in Lagos. On Friday, 8 May, 2020, the Supreme Court of Nigeria ruled that his trial was wrongly conducted and released him from prison while ordering a retrial. While corrupt public servants are promoted and honoured in Nigeria, the reverse is the case in other countries. In Nigeria, the trial of some former state chief executives is stalled and upon completion of their tenure some are now either members of the National Assembly or Members of the Federal Executive Council as Ministers. A former Inspector – General of Police (Tafa Balogun) spent his two year jail term on a soft bed at the National Hospital, Abuja on a 70 – count charge by the EFCC and the embezzlement of N17 billion naira belonging to the Nigeria Police (Adebayo, 2010).

2.3 Theoretical Framework

In this study, the Institutional theory is adopted as the theoretical framework to guide the discussion. The theory was promoted by (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) Meyer and Rowan (1977). The Institutional theory - also known as institutionalism - uses country and government institutional characteristics, such as pre-existing rule of law, well-defined anti-corruption norms, and independent anti-corruption institutions with enforcement powers, to explain corruption in the public sector. Institutional theory "examines the processes and mechanisms by which structures, schemas, rules, and routines become established as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour" (Scott, 2004).

In relation to understanding corruption, institutional theory brings in the social context and provides a taxonomy for understanding how corruption might become entrenched in organizations, in
institutions and in society, despite the existence of an anti-corruption framework (Luo, 2005). Institutional theory considers that corruption is influenced the character, design and transparency of the political system and its institutions. At the same time, it acknowledges that the relationship between corruption, institutions, political systems, culture and gender is highly complex (Debski and others, 2018; Stensöta, Wängnerud and Svensson, 2015). A fair amount of research has focused on the relationship between political institutions on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the prevalence and levels of corruption.

We chose this theory because in this study we are using the generic definition of corruption, in the context of examining corruption in public sector organizations. Moreover, acts of corruption in this study is considered to include theft of assets (asset misappropriation), tax fraud, accounting fraud, bribery and money laundering etc. The model is derived from Luo model (2005) which incorporates institutional theories as the grand theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1988; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996; Scott, 2001).

Another important reason I adopted Institutional Theory is because in Nigeria, as it is implied in the model, the concentration of powers in the government and weak regulatory oversight allow government officials to contravene policies and gain access to resources through fraudulent means. These conditions generate the opportunities for the political class and business community to collude with government officials with the motive of perpetrating corruption for achieving individual gains.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The essential constituents of research methodology are; research design, population and sample size and sampling technique. Others are method/instrument of data collection, administration of instrument, and method of data analysis (Creswell, 2003; Locke, Spirduso and Silverman, 2007). These are substantiated in the sections that follow.

3.2 Research Design

The research design used for the study was mainly survey research. This consist of the use of questionnaire. Documentary research was also used to complement the survey research. The purpose was to enable a generalisation from a sample to a population so that inferences can be made. The use of survey design can also be justified on the bases of economy and the rapid turnaround in data collection (Creswell; 2003). The data collected was cross-sectional, ie collected at one point in time rather than over time.

The research was designed to assess the institutional mechanisms (CCB, ICPC and EFCC) for dealing with corruption in Nigeria Public Service. The perceptions of respondents on these variables were expressed in quantitative terms. The five-point Likert scale of measurement of; very high, high, low, very low and undecided as well as very effective, effective ineffective, very ineffective and undecided etc were used for the independent and dependant variables respectively. These responses were complemented by the data that was collected on the variables from the anti-corruption institutions and transparency international.
3.3 The Population and Sample Size for the Study

The population for the study was 2,303 with questionnaire respondents. The questionnaire respondents consist of the staff of CCB, ICPC, and EFCC. This diverse population was expected to be conversant with the operations and effectiveness or otherwise of the anti-corruption institutions. The details of the population and sample size for the questionnaire distributed were explicated in table 3.1 overleaf.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB)</td>
<td>757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC)</td>
<td>766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2303</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In determining the sample size of the population for the study, Yamane’s (1967) formula as expressed by Israel (1992) will used thus;

\[
\frac{n}{N} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{N(e)^2}{1}}
\]

Where \( n \) = Sample size

\( N = \) Total population

\( e = \) Level of significance (95%)

\[
\frac{2303}{1 + 2303(0.05)^2} \approx \frac{2303}{1 + 2303(0.0025)}
\]
The sample size for the study will be 341 respondents representing 5.28\% of the total population of 2303.

Below shows how the 341 were distributed to institutions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>No of sample distributed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB)</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC)</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>341</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4 Sampling Technique

Since the population for the study was known, probability sampling technique was adopted. Specifically, stratified random sampling was used. For this purpose, the sample was stratified into three, one to represent each of the institutions after which the questionnaire was administered.

3.5 Sources of Data

Both primary and secondary sources of data were explored in the study. The primary sources consist of questionnaire. The use of questionnaire was justified on the basis of its reliability, convenience, preserving anonymity and lower rate of reactivity. The questionnaire mainly consist
of close ended questions for easier coding, tabulation and subsequent analyses. It was for the staff of anti-corruption institutions in the population of the study. (See Appendices ‘B’).

The secondary sources of data used in this study include Official Publications of Governmental Anti-Corruption Watchdogs such as Transparency International (TI), the EFCC, ICPC and CCB. Others include Journals, Newspapers, Magazine, Unpublished Materials and the Internet. These secondary sources complemented the primary source.

3.6 Method Of Data Collection

A total of 341 questionnaires were administred as shown in table 3.1 with the aid of research assistants. The questions on the questionnaire were expected to elicit responses from the respondents on the impact of effectiveness of the anti-corruption institutions. The other one is how the challenges confronting the anticorruption institution are preventing them to function properly on the assessment of Institutional mechanisms in dealing with corruption in the Nigeria Public Service. The responses of the respondents were measured based on five point Likert scale of very high, high, low, very low, and undecided for the independent variables and very effective, effective, ineffective and very ineffective. Non-responses were also classified as undecided.

3.7 Method of Data Analysis

The descriptive tools of analyses was employed in this study. The descriptive tools include the use of frequency tables and simple percentages, in analysing and interpreting the data collected.
CHAPTER FOUR
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSES OF DATA

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the data collected from both primary & secondary sources and the analyses of the data. The primary sources were questionnaire while the secondary source were publications, books, newspaper and journal of anti-corruption institutions in Nigeria (EFCC, ICPC and CCB) and the publications of Transparency.

The responses were presented in frequency tables and percentages. They were also measured on the five-point Likert Scale. The secondary data complemented the responses from the questions. The chapter concludes with the presentation of the major findings of the study.

4.2 Response of Questionnaire

A total of three hundred and forty-one (341) questionnaire which is equivalent to the sample size for the study were administered on the staff of EFCC, ICPC and CCB. The number of questionnaire administered was gotten from 3 contact persons which was on the staff of each of the anti-corruption agencies which was not arbitrarily determined but based on their staff population as indicated in table 3.1 in chapter three. Out of these total, 322 were filled and returned. This represents 94.4% of the total number of questionnaires returned. The rate of return of the questionnaires by each of the institutions was presented in table 4.2.1 overleaf.
Table 4.2.1: The Rate of Return of Questionnaire by Respondents from the Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>MDAs</th>
<th>Total No. of Questionnaires Administered</th>
<th>Total No. of Questionnaires Returned</th>
<th>Percentage (%) of Questionnaires Returned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Economic and Financial Crimes Commission</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>95.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB)</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>93.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC)</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>341</strong></td>
<td><strong>322</strong></td>
<td><strong>94.4%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Field survey, July, 2020

As indicated in table 4.2.1 overleaf above, 322 questionnaires returned was representing 283.1% of the staff of anti-corruption institutions (EFCC, CCB and ICPC). The views of these staff was expected to present a more balanced opinion on the questions contained in the questionnaire. The analyses of data was based on the 322 questionnaire returned.

4.3 Data Presentation and Analysis

For ease of proper accountability, research question was used to analyze respondents’ preferences and views. Similarly, percentage was use to ensure a comprehensive coverage and easy computation towards clear interpretation and understanding of responses from respondents. The analysis is presented thus:
4.3.1 Ability of your Agency in Combating Corruption

The respondents were asked to rate the ability of their agency in combating corruption in Nigeria. Their responses are as presented in table 4.3.2 below.

Table 4.3.2: Ability of your Agency in Combating Corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>41.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>45.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>322</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field survey, July, 2020

As indicated in table 4.3.2 above, 6.52% of the respondents rated the ability of their agency in combating corruption from political interference very high while 41.61% rated it high. On the other hand, 45.34% rated the ability of their agency in combating corruption from political interference low and 4.04% very low. Another 2.48% were undecided on the issue. Thus, the majority (49.38%) rated the ability of their agency in combating corruption institutions from political interference in their activities as low.

4.3.3 Control Over Staff by Anti-Corruption Institutions

Control over staff being one of the elements of the extent of organisational autonomy, the respondents were asked to rate the level of control exercised by the institutions over their staff in the form of appointment, deployment, discharged of their duties and discipline. Their responses were presented in table 4.3.4 overaleaf.
Table 4.3.4: Control over Staff by Anti-Corruption Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>322</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field survey, July, 2020

The data in table 4.3.4 shows that the opinion of the respondents do not sharply differ on the level of control exercised over staff by the anti-corruption institutions in Nigeria. Thus, 23.29% rate the exercise of control over staff very high and 29.81% high. Conversely, 18.32% opined that level of control exercised over staff by the institutions was low and another 5.28% very low. However, 23.29% of the respondents were undecided. Between the two divide low, those who rated the institutions very high and high were in the majority (53.1%) when compared with the response rate of those who rated the institutions control over their staff low and very low which constituted only 23.6%.

4.3.5 Adequacy of Funding of Anti-Corruption Institutions

The respondents were asked to rate the adequacy of funding of the anti-corruption institutions. In order to gauge the effect of the adequacy of funding on the level of the organisations effectiveness, the responses of the respondents were presented in table 4.3.6 overleaf.
### 4.3.6: Adequacy of Funding of Anti-Corruption Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate of Funding</th>
<th>EFCC</th>
<th>ICPC</th>
<th>CCB</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very adequate</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very inadequate</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>125</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Field survey, July, 2020

As the data in table 4.3.6 indicates, 13.04% of the respondents rated the funding of the anti-corruption institutions very adequate and 29.81% opined that it was adequate. However, 34.47% rated it as inadequate and just 13.77% rated the funding of the institutions as very inadequate. Thus, the majority (42.85%) rated the funding of the anti-corruption institutions as adequate. Opinions differed among the staff of the institutions. While the majority of those of the ICPC (42.85%) and CCB (33.69%) rated the funding of their organisations as inadequate, those of the EFCC (40%) opined that theirs’ was adequate.
4.3.7 Level of Financial Autonomy of Anti-Corruption Institutions

Finance being a central determining factor of an organisation’s autonomy, the respondents were asked to rate the level of financial autonomy of the anti-corruption institutions. Financial autonomy in this study means the possession of distinct funds through direct funding of the institutions. Their responses were presented in table 4.3.8 below.

Table 4.3.8: The Level of Financial Autonomy of Anti-Corruption Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>29.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>31.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>32.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field survey, July, 2020

The data in table 4.3.8 above shows that, 2.79% of the sample respondents opined that the level of financial autonomy of the anti-corruption institutions was very high and 29.50% high, as high as 32.29% of the sample respondents were undecided. Another 31.37% and 4.04% rated the institutions financial autonomy low and very low respectively. Thus, the majority (35.41%) of the respondents rated the level of the institutions financial autonomy low.
Table 4.3.9 Effectiveness of Plea Bargaining as a means of dealing with corruption

**Offenders**

For those whose trials for corruption offences were completed, the respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness of plea bargaining as a means of dealing with corruption offenders. Their responses were presented in table 4.3.10 below.

**Table 4.3.10: Effectiveness of Plea Bargaining as a means of dealing with corruption**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>37.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>31.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>14.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>322</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Field survey, July, 2020

The responses of the samples respondents show that 6.83% rated that the effectiveness of plea bargaining as a means of dealing with corruption offenders was 6.83 very high and 37.27% high while 9.94% were undecided. Conversely, 31.66% and 14.91% rated that the level of effectiveness of plea bargaining for dealing with corruption offenders low and very low respectively. The majority of respondents rated the Effectiveness of Plea Bargaining low, in aggregate terms, (46.57%) as compared to 44.10% who rated Effectiveness of Plea Bargaining high.
4.3.11 The Rate of Corruption in the Federal Public Service before the establishment of EFCC, ICPC and CCB

As the first step in determining the effectiveness of the anti-corruption institutions, the respondents were asked to rate the level of corruption in the Federal public service before the establishment of the institutions. Their responses were presented in table 4.3.12 below.

4.3.12: The Rate of Corruption in the Federal Public Service before the Establishment of the EFCC, ICPC and CCB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>56.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>39.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>322</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Field survey, July, 2020

The data in table 4.3.12 indicates that the majority (56.52%) of the sample respondents opined that the rate of corruption in Federal Public Service was very high before the establishment of the anti-corruption institutions while 39.44% rated it high. Only 0.623% of the sample respondents were undecided. However, 3.42% and 0.00% rated the level of corruption in the Federal Public Service low and very low respectively before the establishment of the anti-corruption institutions. Thus, we can infer that the rate of corruption in the Federal Public Service before the establishment of the anti-corruption institutions was very high.
4.3.13 Effectiveness of Whistle Blowing policy

The respondents were therefore asked to rate the Effectiveness of Whistle Blowing policy. The responses of the respondents were presented in table 4.3.14 below.

Table 4.3.14: Effectiveness of Whistle Blowing policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>18.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>26.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>47.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>322</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field survey, July, 2020

From the data in table 4.3.14 above, only 4.36% of the sample respondents rated the Effectiveness of Whistle Blowing policy very high, 18.01% high and only 4.35% were undecided. Conversely, 26.09% of the sample respondents rated the level of Effectiveness of Whistle Blowing policy low and 47.20% very low. Thus, the level of Effectiveness of Whistle Blowing policy has been very low.

4.3.15 Level of effectiveness of the Anti-Corruption Institutions in Combating Corruption in the Federal Public Service

Using the indices of effectiveness ranging from determining the rate of corruption in the Federal Public Service before the establishment of the institutions, their prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution activities, and their ability to reduce the level of corruption, the
respondents were asked to rate the level effectiveness of the institutions. Their responses were presented in table 4.3.16 below.

Table 4.3.16: Level of effectiveness of the Anti-Corruption Institutions in Combating Corruption in the Federal Public Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Effective</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>25.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineffective</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>50.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Ineffective</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Survey, July, 2020

From the data in table 4.3.16 above, 6.52% of the respondents rated the level of effectiveness of the anti-corruption institutions very effective and 25.47% effective in combating corruption in the Federal public service while 10.56% were undecided. Conversely, 50.93% and 6.52% of the respondents rated the institutions ineffective and very ineffective respectively. Thus, we can say that the anti-corruption institutions have been ineffective in combating corruption in the Federal Public Service. Before the establishment of the institutions, the level of corruption in the federal public was high as indicated in table 4.3.12. In spite of the establishment of the institutions, the
rate of corruption in the federal public service still remains high. This, negates the concept of effectiveness.

4.3.17 Level of Performance of the anti-corruption institution

The respondents were asked to rate the level of performance of the anti-corruption institution. Their responses were presented in table 4.3.18 below.

Table 4.3.18: Level of Performance of the anti-corruption institution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>24.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>44.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>27.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field survey, July, 2020

The data in table 4.3.18 above indicates that, 3.73% of the sample respondents rated the performance of the anti-corruption institution as very High, 24.22% High, 44.72% low and 27.33% very low. Thus, in the opinion of the sample respondents, the performance of the anti-corruption institution is low.

4.3.19 The Level of Effectiveness of Corruption Reporting System in the Federal Public Service

The respondents were asked to indicate the level of effectiveness of corruption reporting system in the federal public service. Their responses were presented in table 4.3.20 overleaf.
Table 4.3.20: The Level of Effectiveness of Corruption – Reporting System in the Federal Public Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Effective</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>13.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>26.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineffective</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>42.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Ineffective</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>13.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>322</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As shown in table 4.3.20, 13.98% of the sample respondents rated the corruption reporting system very effective, 26.71% effective, 42.55% ineffective and 13.04 very ineffective. However, 3.73% were undecided. From the view of the respondents, the corruption reporting system in the federal public service was ineffective.

4.3.21 Effect of the Transparency in the Federal Public Service on the Effectiveness of fighting corruption

The respondents were asked if they agree that the level of transparency in the federal public service has affected the level of effectiveness of their agency to fight corruption. Their responses were presented in table 4.3.22 overleaf.
Table 4.3.22: Effect of Transparency on Fighting Corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>21.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>58.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>16.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>197</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field survey, July, 2020

The data in table 4.3.22 above indicates that 21.11% of sample respondents strongly agreed that the level of transparency in the federal public service affects the effectiveness of fighting corruption while 58.39% agreed. On the other hand 16.77% disagreed and 3.73% of the sample respondents strongly disagreed. Thus, the level transparency in the federal public service has affected the effectiveness of fighting corruption.

4.3.23 The Level of challenges confronting the anti-corruption agencies

The respondents were asked to indicate the level of challenges confronting the anti-corruption agencies. Their responses were presented in table 4.3.24 overleaf.
Table 4.3.24: The Level of challenges confronting the anti-corruption agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>47.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>25.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>11.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>322</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Field survey, July, 2020

As shown in table 4.3.24 above, 47.20% of the sample respondents rated the corruption reporting system very high, 25.78% high, 11.80% low and 7.45 very low. However, 7.76% were undecided. From the view of the respondents, the challenges confronting the anti-corruption agencies was very high.

4.3.25 Adequacy of Punishments for Corruption Offences

The respondents were asked to rate the level of adequacy of punishments of convicts. Their responses were presented in table 4.3.26 overleaf.
Table 4.3.26: Adequacy of Punishments for Corruption Offences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Adequate</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>17.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>44.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very inadequate</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>21.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>322</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Field survey, July, 2020

From the data in table 4.3.26 above, 8.39% of the sample respondents rated the level of punishments for corruption offences very adequate, 17.70% adequate and 8.70% were undecided. On other hand, 44.10% rated the sanctions as inadequate and 21.12% very inadequate. Thus, it can be stated that the sanctions for corruption offences were inadequate (65.22%).

4.3.27 The Level of Enforcement of Punishments for Corruption Offences

The respondents were therefore asked to rate the level of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences. The responses of the respondents were presented in table 4.3.28 overleaf.
Table 4.3.28: The Level of Enforcement of Punishments for Corruption Offences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>29.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>51.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field survey, July, 2020

From the data in table 4.3.28 above, only 2.48% of the sample respondents rated the level of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences very high, 6.21% high and only 9.63% were undecided. Conversely, 29.81% of the sample respondents rated the level of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences low and 51.88% very low.

4.4 Major Findings

(i) Most of the sample respondents opined that all the institutions exercised control over their staff just like the chief executives of the institutions were being controlled by the Presidency. This does not seem to have significant effect on the performance of the institutions.

(ii) Most respondents indicate that the EFCC was adequately funded by government in addition to the donations it receives from international agencies. The contrary was the case for ICPC and the CCB. All the anti-corruption institutions were not financially autonomous as they were funded through the presidency.
(iii) A large number of the respondents are of the opinion that he federal public service is not transparent and the corruption reporting system is ineffective. In the opinion of majority the non-transparent nature of public service has affected the effectiveness of corruption reporting system which has in turn affected the level of effectiveness of the anti-corruption institutions.

(iv) Moreover, in the course of this study, I observed that the institutions have not been as transparent as they were suppose to be. However, the ICPC have been found to be more accessible than the EFCC and the CCB which I had more access of the information on the activities of the ICPC than the others.

(v) Most respondents are of the opinion that punishments for corruption offences were mild and not severe enough to serve as preventive and deterrent measure. The level of enforcement of these punishments was also adjudged low by majority of the respondents and has adversely affected the effectiveness of the anti-corruption institutions in combating corruption in the federal public service.

(VI) Some of the major problems affecting the effectiveness of the institutions were identified from the open-ended question. These include an overburdened judiciary resulting in slow trial of suspects and non-follow-up of cases especially by the CCB as well as inadequate political will on the part of the judiciary and the institutions to prosecute corrupt public servants. Others major challenges identified were selective prosecution of alleged corrupt officials especially by the EFCC, lack of transparency, lack autonomy, inadequate punishment, weak democratic institutions, as well as improper implementation of the Whistle Blower and the Plea Bargain Policies.
(VII) Similarly, in the opened ended question on what measures to be taken to deal with the challenges, steps such as making the institution more autonomous in funding and freedom of action as well as improved transparency have been mentioned. Other measures mentioned include speedy trial of suspects and diligent enforcement of punishment in respective of who is involved as well as proper implementation of the Whistle Blower and Plea bargain policies. Also mentioned was the need to not only strengthen democratic institutions but to make them function properly.
5.1 Summary

The increasing incidence of corruption with impunity especially in the public service is one of the major challenges of governments and has therefore, became a matter of public concern. In response to this, the Federal Government of Nigeria established CCB, EFCC and ICPC to speed head the fight against corruption. This study attempts to assess the effectiveness of (CCB, EFCC, and ICPC) as a mechanism for dealing with corruption in the Nigeria public service between 1999 – 2020. Among other things, the study examines the level of effectiveness of the anti-corruption institutions in combating corruption. and how it affects their ability to deliver on their mandate. The study also identified the problems facing the anti-corruption institutions in fighting corruption in the Federal Public Service and suggested ways to summout, thereby making the anti-corruptions institutions more effective. Similarly, the efficacy of the plea bargain and Whistle Blower Policies of the FGN were also examined.

The significance of the study to research, policy and practice of governance have been highlighted. The limitation of the study has also been acknowledged. The study covered the period 1999 – 2020 and was limited to the effectiveness of the CCB, EFCC and the ICPC in dealing with corruption in the Nigeria public service. Some terms and concepts used in the study were operationally defined as used in the study. These include the concepts of corruption, effectiveness, enforcement, and institutional autonomy. Others were institutional mechanism, public service, punishment and corruption reporting.
The literature relating to the study was thematically reviewed. These include inter-alia: the concept and types of corruption, the perceived causes of corruption and strategies for combating corruption in the public service. Literature was also reviewed on the Plea Bargaining policy, effective corruption reporting system, Whistle Blower policy and the enforcement of punishments for corruption offences. A theoretical framework using the institutional theory of corruption was adopted as a theory to guide the discussion. The research design for the study was mainly survey research consisting of the use of questionnaire administered on the staff of the anti-corruptions institutions. These were complemented with content analysis of data from the Questionnaire. The total population for the study was 2,303 with 322 questionnaire respondents. Stratified random sampling technique was adopted. Both primary and secondary sources of data were explored.

The data obtained from the field representing the views of the respondents were presented in tables and analysed using frequencies and percentages. The data centred on the questions on the bio-data of the sample respondents and the variables used in the study. From the data presented and analysed, the study revealed that the anti-corruptions institutions were not free from political interference especially the EFCC. While the institutions exercised control over their staff, the chairmen of the institutions were controlled by the President. In addition, only the EFCC was found to be adequately funded. However, all the three institutions lacked financial autonomy as they were funded through the Presidency.

Even though the respondents observed the occurrence of acts of corruption in public service very often, these acts were seldom reported despite their the knowledge of corruption reporting process. The reasons advanced for this development was that reported cases of corruption were often not investigated and culprits were hardly punished. There was also the potential danger of harassing corruption reporters. The low level of transparency in the federal public service has
also adversely affected the effectiveness of corruption reporting system. This has in turn affected the effectiveness of the anti-corruption institutions in combating corruption in the Nigeria public service.

Although, the anti-corruption institutions were rated ineffective in dealing with corruption in the Nigeria public service within 1999 – 2020, EFCC fared better than the other two institutions. Some of the problems affecting the effectiveness of the institutions were identified. These include an overburdened judiciary resulting in slow trial of suspects and non-follow-up of cases especially by the CCB as well as inadequate political will on the part of the judiciary and the institutions to prosecute corrupt public servants. Other major challenges identified were selective prosecution of alleged corrupt officials especially by the EFCC, lack of transparency, lack of autonomy, inadequate punishment, weak democratic institutions, as well as improper implementation of the Whistle Blower and the Plea Bargain Policies.

5.2 Conclusions

From the data presented and analysed in chapter four, the study concludes that the level of autonomy of the anti-corruption institutions for the period under study was low. The corruption reporting system was ineffective and the rate of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences was also low. The anti-corruption institutions were found to be ineffective in dealing with corruption in federal public service.

It must be stressed that the low level of autonomy of the anti-corruption institutions, the ineffective corruption reporting system in the public service and the low level of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences were among other factors responsible for the ineffectiveness of the anti-corruption institutions in dealing with corruption in the federal public service. Therefore, an increase in the level of autonomy of the anti-corruption institutions, an increase in
the level of effectiveness of corruption reporting system in the public service, and an increase in
the level of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences will among others improve the
level of effectiveness of the institutions in dealing with corruption in the Nigerian public service.

5.3 Recommendations

In view of the findings made in chapter four, the study recommends that;

(i) The federal government should be committed to the sincere translation of the expressed
political will of fighting corruption into reality by allowing the anti-corruption institutions to
operate without political intervention in order not to compromise with their statutorily assigned
responsibilities. This can be achieved through guaranteed tenure of the chairmen of the
institutions especially the EFCC.

(ii) The adequate funding of the EFCC should be sustained and possibly improved upon in
view of increasing incidence of corruption. The ICPC should be adequately funded to enable it
also to establish more state offices and employ more staff. This will enable the agency ease its
operations through decentralisation. Adequate funding of the CCB will enable it employ more
staff, make its presence felt at the level of senatorial districts and later at all local government
headquarters in Nigeria in view of the enormous responsibilities of the agency. The anti-
corruption institutions should be directly funded rather than through the Presidency in order to
ensure their financial autonomy.

(iii) The laws establishing the institutions should be strengthened by according them greater
operational autonomy to enable them perform their responsibilities without hindrance. Parts of
the laws subjugating the institutions to other institutions should be repealed. A typical example is
the provision of section 39 of the EFCC Act which empowers the Attorney General of the
Federation and Minister of Justice, to act as supervisory Ministry and to make rules and regulations with respect to the exercise of any of the duties, functions and powers of the commission. This powers should be entrusted on the National Assembly as the judiciary abused such powers in certain trials of corrupt public officials.

(iv) An effective anti-corruption strategy should all embracing consisting of prevention, detection, investigation, enforcement, public awareness and institutional building. This should be done in a consistent and coherent manner, broad base approach, and on long term perspective in order to be effective. These requirements are systemic as an imbalance in anyone of them can lead to disequilibrium.

(v) In order to facilitate effective corruption reporting system, reported cases should be promptly investigated and culprits punished. The identity of corruption reporters should be kept confidential in order to protect them from potential danger of harassment. A closer relationship and confidence building measures between the citizens and the institutions should be enhanced to facilitate effective corruption reporting as it will elicit citizens and other stakeholders participation and trust in the activities of the institutions.

(vi) The Freedom of Information (FOI) bill should be passed and signed into an act in a timely manner to facilitate transparency in public institutions and anti-corruption institutions. This will get the citizens informed and acquainted with their activities and solicit their support and cooperation for the public ownership of the anti-corruption war. Paragraph 3, part 1 of the third schedule of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 should be amended to ensure compulsory public declaration of assets and liabilities of public servants. This will enable citizens have access to assets disclosure forms of public servants and petition the commission of
any breach of the Code of Conduct. Privacy should not be an obstacle to vetting the origin of unexplained wealth.

(vii) The reform of the country’s legal, judicial and prosecution system is required by among others employing more competent prosecutors and re-orienting the judges to demonstrate more courage in executing corruption cases. In the interim, special anti-corruption courts can be established for the speedy trial of corruption cases to relieve the currently overburdened judiciary. As part of the reform, section 308 of the constitution that confer immunity on the president and his vice should be amended to exclude prosecution for corruption offences.

(viii) Punishments for corruption offences should be reviewed and made more severe in order to serve its purpose as a preventive and deterrent measure. A minimum of ten years jail term without option of fine to life imprisonment for cases relating to state capture is recommended. The anti-corruption institutions especially the CCB and ICPC should also follow-up declarations and cases under investigation. In the process, corruptly acquired wealth should be confiscated, forfeited and transparently accounted for by the institutions. These are expected to raise the level of expected penalties relative to the expected benefits of corruption. Thus, making the act of corruption less attractive.

(ix) As corruption in the federal public service has become more complex, advanced technology is required by the anti-corruption institutions in detecting and investigating corruption offences. International collaboration with relevant institutions and countries is required for capacity building of the staff of the institutions and for facility update.
Deliberate and concerted effort should be made by the federal government to provide better welfare package for the staff of the EFCC, ICPC and the CCB. This is essential to motivating them for enthusiastic and better performance. The operatives also deserve adequate security, better training, and exposures to enable them effectively cope with the hazards associated with their tasks.
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APPENDIX ‘A’

Department of Government and
Public Administration,
Faculty of Management and Social sciences,
Baze University, Abuja

Chairman
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)
Abuja.

Chairman
Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC)
Abuja.

Chairman
Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB)
Abuja.


Dear sir,

I am a student of Baze University, Abuja, currently carrying out a research on the above-mentioned topic. I hereby solicit your assistance in answering the attached questionnaire as the study is purely an academic exercise and responses would be treated with confidentiality and solely for the purpose of the research.

While thanking you in anticipation for your cooperation, accept the assurances of my highest regards always.

Yours faithfully,

NADER TIJANI JIBRIN
BU/17C/BS/2762
APPENDIX ‘B’

QUESTIONNAIRE

Please tick [ √ ] as appropriate in your answer to the following questions.

(1) How would you rate the ability of your agency in combating corruption?

(a) Very high [  ]
(b) High [  ]
(c) Low [  ]
(d) Very low [  ]
(e) Undecided [  ]

(2) How would you rate the level of control exercised over staff by your organisation?

(a) Very high [  ]
(b) High [  ]
(c) Low [  ]
(d) Very low [  ]
(e) Undecided [  ]
(3) How adequate is the rate of funding of your organisation?
   (a) Very Adequate
   (b) Adequate
   (c) Inadequate
   (d) Very Inadequate
   (e) Undecided

(4) How would you rate the level of financial autonomy of your organisation?
   (a) Very high
   (b) High
   (c) Low
   (d) Very low
   (e) Undecided

(5) How would you rate the effectiveness of plea bargaining as a means of dealing with corruption offenders?
   (a) Very high
   (b) High
   (c) Low
   (d) Very Low
   (e) Undecided
(6) How would you rate the level of corruption in the Federal Public Service before the establishment of the anti-corruption institutions?

(a) Very high [ ]
(b) High [ ]
(c) Low [ ]
(d) Very Low [ ]
(e) Undecided [ ]

(7) How would you rate the effectiveness of whistle Blowing Policy?

(a) Very high [ ]
(b) High [ ]
(c) Low [ ]
(d) Very Low [ ]
(e) Undecided [ ]

(8) How would you rate the level of effectiveness of the anti-corruption institutions in combating corruption in the Federal Public Service?

(a) Very Effective [ ]
(b) Effective [ ]
(c) Ineffective [ ]
(d) Very ineffective [ ]
(e) Undecided [ ]
(9) How would you rate the level of performance of the anti-corruption institution?

(a) Very high [ ]
(b) High [ ]
(c) Low [ ]
(d) Very Low [ ]
(e) Undecided [ ]

(10) How would you rate the level of effectiveness of corruption reporting in the federal public service?

(a) Very Effective [ ]
(b) Effective [ ]
(c) Ineffective [ ]
(d) Very ineffective [ ]
(e) Undecided [ ]

(11) Do you agree that the level of transparency in the public service affects the level of effectiveness of your agency’s ability to fight corruption?

(a) Strongly Agree [ ]
(b) Agree [ ]
(c) Disagree [ ]
(d) Strongly Disagree [ ]
(e) Undecided [ ]
(12) To what extent are the challenges confronting the anti-corruption agencies affecting their performance?

(a) Very high [ ]
(b) High [ ]
(c) Low [ ]
(d) Very Low [ ]
(e) Undecided [ ]

(13) How adequate are the punishments for corruption offences in the Federal Public Service?

(a) Very Adequate [ ]
(b) Adequate [ ]
(c) Inadequate [ ]
(d) Very inadequate [ ]
(e) Undecided [ ]

(14) How would you rate the level of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences in the Federal Public Service?

(a) Very high [ ]
(b) High [ ]
(c) Low [ ]
(d) Very Low [ ]
(e) Undecided [ ]
(15) What in your opinion are the major challenges affecting the effectiveness of the anti-corruption institutions in fighting corruption in the Federal Public Service? List them

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(16) What in your opinion should be done to deal with these challenges and make the anti-corruption institutions more effective in the federal public service? list them

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